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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This lawsuit was brought by Galleon Enterprises Inc. (“Galleon”) for
title to, or in the alternative, a salvage award for salvage activities
conducted on an unidentified, wrecked, and abandoned vessel and its cargo
that sank on or about the year 1734. (R. at 3.) At issue are several federal
laws including the Endangered Species Act, (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 –
1599 (2008), the National Marine Sanctuary Act (“NMSA”), 16 U.S.C. §§
1431-1445(a) (2008), The Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”), 33 U.S.C. §
401 et. seq., and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“CWA”), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2008), intertwined with and subsumed within an in
rem admiralty action. This case was properly brought in Admiralty with the
filing of a verified complaint in rem. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). Further,
Galleon’s complaint was also properly filed in district court under federal
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2008).
All parties have brought timely appeal of the district court’s final order
on Galleon’s complaint. Before trial, the parties stipulated to standing and
the district court issued a final order on the merits of Galleon’s claims on
November 15, 2008. The parties properly brought appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Whether the SMCA applies to the wreck referred to as La Contesta.
II. Whether the shipwreck is subject to sovereign immunity and, if so,
whether salvage requires the consent of the sovereign.
III. Whether the NOAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying
Galleon a salvage and recovery permit for its activities within the
GCNMS.
IV. Whether a NMSA permit is required for the wreck and the cargo
irrespective of whether that cargo lies within or without the boundaries
of the GCNMS.
V. Whether the Secretary of Commerce acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in denying Galleon an Endangered Species permit to drill through the
endangered deep sea coral.
VI. Whether a COE and/or NPDES permit is required for Galleon’s
salvage activities.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order in the United States District Court
for the District of New Union in Admiralty. The parties stipulated to
standing, and the district court made a ruling on the merits of Galleon’s
claims on November 15, 2008. (R. at 1). Galleon Enterprises, Inc.
(“Galleon”) brought suit by filing in Admiralty a verified complaint in rem
for title to, or in the alternative, a salvage award for salvage activities
conducted on an unidentified, wrecked, and abandoned vessel and its cargo
that sank on or about the year 1734. (R. at 3). The Kingdom of Spain
(“Spain”) intervened. Spain sought an order declaring Spain to be the
owner of the vessel; an injunction forbidding Galleon from conducting any
salvage activities at the site without the express permission, approval, and
authorization of Spain; and an order directing Galleon to return to Spain
any objects it removed from the site. (R. at 4). The United States also
intervened, claiming Galleon failed to comply with the regulations of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), the U.S.
Army Corp of Engineers (“COE”), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”). (R. at 4). Therefore, the United States sought an order
dismissing Galleon’s complaint and denying Galleon’s in rem admiralty
action under both the law of finds and/or the law of salvage. (R. at 4).
The district court held Spain had not abandoned the ship and therefore
Galleon could not obtain title to the wreck under the law of finds, but that
Galleon was entitled to a salvage award for the cargo found outside the
Gold Coast National Marine Sanctuary (“GCNMS”). (R. at 8-9). The
district court also held Galleon violated both the RHA and CWA by failing
to obtain the relevant permits and that the Secretary of Commerce acted
properly in denying Galleon a permit under the ESA. (R. at 10-11, 13). All
parties appealed. Galleon takes issue with the court’s ruling on the law of
finds and law of salvage and challenges the authority of the COE, the EPA,
and the NOAA. (R. at 1). Galleon also appeals the Secretary of
Commerce’s decision not to issue a permit pursuant to the ESA. (R. at 1).
Spain appeals the district court’s ruling under the Sunken Military Craft Act
(“SMCA”) and the law of salvage regarding all artifacts. (R. at 1). Finally,
the United States appeals the ruling regarding the NOAA’s authority to
require a permit to recover artifacts outside the boundary of the GCNMS.
(R. at 2). The United States also appeals the district court’s application of
the SMCA. (R. at 2).

3

BB_GALLEON_26.2

598

7/27/2009 5:52 PM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case revolves around the remains of an unidentified vessel that
was sank around the year 1734. (R. at 3). Spain claims the vessel is a
Royal Spanish Navy military frigate named La Contesta. (R. at 5). In 1732,
La Contesta was one of six frigates assigned to protect twenty Spanish
merchant ships that were sailing from Spain to Peru. (R. at 5). On the
return voyage, La Contesta was assigned to carry mail, private passengers,
merchant goods, and other cargo in the same fashion as the merchant ships.
(R. at 5). As the fleet entered the straits of Florida, it was met by a
hurricane, and La Contesta, along with almost half of her fleet, was lost.
(R. at 6). Pursuant to the NMSA, the GCNMS was established off the coast
of New Union to include submerged lands in which these Spanish ships are
buried to protect natural and historical resources, including deep sea coral
and Johnson seagrasses, which are listed as endangered species pursuant to
the ESA. (R. at 5). The NOAA has promulgated regulations prohibiting
activities that might affect sanctuary resources, including the discharge or
deposit of substances and the removal or damaging of cultural, natural, or
historical resources. (R. at 5). Listed in the regulations are seagrasses, coral
reefs, and shipwrecks. (R. at 5).
In April 2008, Galleon invested $300,000 in searching for treasure and
found several artifacts between twenty-three and twenty-four miles offshore
in areas both in and slightly outside of the GCNMS. (R. at 5-6). Galleon
applied to the NOAA for a research and recovery permit to search for the
ship and excavate cargo that it believed lay inside the GCNMS. (R. at 5).
The NOAA determined the ship was probably Spanish and summarily
denied Galleon’s permit application because it did not include
documentation of Spain’s approval of the excavation. (R. at 6). Spain
refused Galleon’s request mainly because it feared the destruction of the
scientific and historic integrity of the wreck and because of the
archaeological value of the site. (R. at 6.) Galleon began salvage operations
anyway, constructing a drilling platform to drill through coral to reach the
shipwreck. (R. at 6). Galleon used a “mailbox” technique that directs
propeller wash downward, removing seabed sediment. (R. at 6).
The action filed by Galleon stated four counts: (1) Galleon is entitled
to ownership of the wreck; (2) in the alternative, Galleon is entitled to a
liberal salvage award; (3) Spain no longer exercises sovereign prerogative
over the wrecked vessel; and (4) the Executive Branch of the United States
has no jurisdiction to regulate Galleon’s salvage operations. (R. at 6). On
June, 25, 2008, the district court ordered: (1) the arrest of the shipwreck and
artifacts; (2) Galleon be granted exclusive rights and that all finds be
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deposited with the court; and (3) Galleon publish notice of the claim and
specifically provide notice to the United States and Spain. (R. at 6). On
August 15, 2008, Spain intervened, arguing that the vessel and its contents
are owned by the Kingdom of Spain. (R. at 7). Galleon responded by
asserting that the site does not represent any vessel and that additional
research and salvage are necessary to establish identity of the vessel. (R. at
7). Also on August 15, 2008, the United States filed an answer asserting its
regulatory authority over the shipwreck and all its cargo lying both inside
and outside the boundaries of the GCNMS. (R. at 7). The U.S. claims
Galleon violated the ESA, the NMSA, and the RHA and should not be
given title to the wreck or receive a salvage award. (R. at 7).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Kingdom of Spain had the burden to prove the shipwreck was a
sunken military craft as defined by SMCA. Because they failed to do this,
the SMCA does not apply and the traditional laws of salvage and finds do
apply. Even if the wreck is La Contesta, the SMCA still would not apply
because La Contesta was not on military, noncommercial service when it
sank. This determination is made at the time the ship sank, and therefore
whether La Contesta may have been on military duty at some point before
the wreck is irrelevant.
The shipwreck is not subject to sovereign immunity, and the consent
of the sovereign is not required to salvage the wreckage. Sovereign
immunity does not apply when a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a
maritime lien and the lien is based upon a commercial activity of the
foreign state, nor does it apply when the vessel and cargo in question have
been abandoned, as is the case here. Also, sovereign immunity does not
apply to the cargo recovered by Galleon and brought before the Court.
Further, even if this Court determines that sovereign immunity does apply,
consent of the sovereign is not required for salvage activities.
The NOAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Galleon a
salvage and recovery permit for its activities within the GCNMS because it
considered factors other than those contemplated by Congress. But should
the Court determine that Spain’s approval was a proper consideration, the
NOAA failed to articulate a rational connection between the facts found and
the decision made.
Galleon is entitled to title or a salvage award for the cargo outside the
GCNMS even if the NMSA denies Galleon’s permit for the cargo inside the
GCNMS because the cargo found outside the boundaries can be segregated
from the cargo found within the boundaries. Courts have the ability to
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divide wrecks subject to multiple claims of ownership and have used this
ability to find that part of a single shipwreck is abandoned while another
part is not. The NOAA has no authority outside the GCNMS, and therefore
Galleon should be awarded either title or a salvage award to this cargo.
The Secretary of Commerce acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying Galleon an Endangered Species permit, and no reasonable
connection was shown between the facts and its decision, as Galleon’s
actions do not constitute a “take.” Galleon has not threatened the continued
existence of either the deep sea coral or the Johnson seagrasses. Further,
the Secretary of Commerce acted without considering relevant factors and
did not demonstrate a reasoned connection between the facts and its
decision.
Neither a COE nor a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) permit is required for Galleon’s salvage activities because the
wreck rests outside the territorial waters of the United States. Legislation of
Congress applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) does not extend the
authority of the CWA or RHA. However, even if Congress had the power
to require these permits, Galleon did not need a COE or NPDES permit for
the discharge of a pollutant because the water used in the mailbox technique
does not constitute “dredge material.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The scope of review in admiralty actions is limited, and the judgment
of the district court may be set aside only when clearly erroneous.
McAllister v. U.S., 348 U.S. 19 (1954). A finding is clearly erroneous
when, though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with
a definite and firm conviction that an error has occurred. Guzman v.
Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 702 (1963). Admiralty review under this standard
allows greater flexibility than would an appeal from a jury verdict because
it considers “the qualitative factor of truth and right of the case – the
impression that a fundamental wrong has been reached.” Oil Screw Noah’s
Ark v. Bentley & Felton Corp., 322 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1963). The appellate
court is permitted to consider all the evidence in the record as well as the
personal knowledge of the judges. U.S.-American President Lines, Ltd. v.
Towboat Seneca, 384 F.2d 511 (2nd Cir. 1967). Additionally, in the case of
erroneous conclusions of law, full appellate review is appropriate. Esso
Std. Oil S. A. v. S. S. Gasbras Sul, 387 F.2d 573 (2nd Cir. 1967).
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ARGUMENT
I. THE LAWS OF SALVAGE AND FINDS APPLY TO THE
UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL BECAUSE IT IS NOT A SUNKEN
MILITARY CRAFT ACCORDING TO THE SMCA.
The SMCA provides that the traditional admiralty law of finds does
not apply to sunken foreign military craft in United States waters. Sunken
Military Craft Act, Pub L. No. 108-375, § 1406(c)(2), 118 Stat. 1811, 2094
(2005). It also provides that the law of salvage does not apply to sunken
foreign military craft in United States waters unless the salvor receives
express permission from the relevant foreign state. Id. § 1406(d)(2).
“United States waters” means the contiguous zone of the United States. Id.
§ 1408(4). The contiguous zone extends twenty-four nautical miles from
the United States’ shores. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701
(Aug. 2, 1999). Because the shipwreck lies within the contiguous zone of
the United States, it falls into the geographical area controlled by the
SMCA. (R. at 3). However, the relevant provisions of the SMCA apply
only to “sunken military craft.” SMCA § 1406(c)(2), (d)(2). The SMCA
identifies a sunken military craft as “any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or
other vessel that was owned or operated by a government on military
noncommercial service when it sunk.” Id. §1408(3)(A). At trial, the
Kingdom of Spain had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the unidentified shipwreck was a sunken military craft as
defined by the SMCA. (R at 8). Because Spain failed to prove this, the
SMCA does not apply to the wreck, and the traditional laws of salvage and
finds apply.
A.

The evidence at trial was insufficient to show the wreck at issue is
La Contesta or any other wreck that qualifies as a sunken military
craft.

Finders and salvors of shipwrecks are not required to positively
identify the wrecks before bringing in rem admiralty proceedings against
them. Fathom Exploration, L.L.C. v. The Unidentified Vessel or Vessels,
352 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1225 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (holding that salvor’s inability
to identify vessel did not constitute a violation of Rules C(2)(b) or E(2)(a)
of the Supplemental Rules of Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims). To
require finders and salvors to do so would chill salvage operations and
result in the loss of historical artifacts. Id. at 1225. Under the Supplemental
Rules, salvors are only required to provide reasonably available information
about the location, nature, and embedded status of the wreck. Id. at 1227.
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Galleon supplied the coordinates of the wreck, described the nature of the
wreck, and provided the fact that it is embedded. (R. at 5-7). Galleon has
thus supplied sufficient information. However, this information does not
prove that the wreck is La Contesta.
Galleon has not discovered any remains of a ship’s hull or any other
structure that would be associated with a shipwreck. (R. at 7). It
discovered a large field of artifacts that may or may not be the site of a
shipwreck. (R. at 7). The cargo Galleon discovered could be jettisoned
cargo; cargo from a French, British, or Dutch pirate ship; or even another
ship lost at the same time as La Contesta. (R. at 7). La Contesta was only
one ship out of a fleet of twenty six, twenty of which were Spanish
merchant galleons, unaffiliated with Spain’s military. (R. at 5). Half of the
vessels in the fleet were lost along with La Contesta. (R. at 5). Not only
would it be impossible for Galleon to identify the vessel as La Contesta at
this early stage, but it is likely the unidentified wreck is a lost merchant
galleon, not La Contesta or any other military vessel. Because it would be
impossible at this point to determine with certainty that the shipwreck is a
sunken military craft according to the SMCA, Galleon should be allowed to
continue with its salvage activities.
B.

If the wreck is La Contesta, the SMCA does not apply because La
Contesta was not on military, noncommercial service when it sank.
The SMCA defines the term “sunken military craft” as:
all or any portion of: (A) any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or other
vessel that was owned or operated by a government on military
noncommercial service when it sank; (B) any sunken military aircraft or
military spacecraft that was owned or operated by a government when it
sank; and (C) the associated contents of a craft referred to in subparagraph
(A) or (B), if title thereto has not been abandoned or transferred by the
government concerned.

SMCA §1408(3) (emphasis added). The SMCA provides no further
explanation of the term “military noncommercial service,” a term crucial to
this Court’s determination. The Act’s legislative history shows its purpose
was to codify the principle that governmental vessels in noncommercial
service should be accorded special protection under the concept of
sovereign immunity and should be exempted from the jurisdiction of any
other state. H.R. Rep. No. 108-767, at 817 (2004) (Conf. Rep.). This
suggests the definition of “noncommercial service” in the SMCA is parallel
to its definition under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
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La Contesta was not on “military noncommercial service” as
it is defined under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is codified in the FSIA, which
provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
United States courts. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). The Act provides that foreign states are immune
from United States jurisdiction unless certain exceptions apply, all of which
have to do with commercial activity. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488-489 (1962). However, the Act does not clearly
define the term “commercial.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U.S. 607, 612 (1992). In interpreting the term, the United States Supreme
Court in Weltover found that the FSIA was intended to codify the
“restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity. Id. at 612-13. Under the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a state engages in commercial
activity when it exercises only those powers that can also be exercised by
private citizens, as opposed to those powers that only sovereigns may
exercise. Id. at 614 (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976)).
La Contesta sank en route from Peru to Spain carrying commercial
trading goods and cargo. (R. at 4). It had taken on the role of a private
merchant galleon when it sank. La Contesta was performing a function that
a private, civilian vessel would be able to perform when it sank, not
something that only a sovereign could do. Thus, it was on commercial
service at the time it sank.
2.

The fact that La Contesta was possibly on military
noncommercial service before it sank is irrelevant to the
consideration of whether it is a sunken military craft
pursuant to the SMCA.

The distinction between commercial and sovereign activity is
challenging today, but it is even more difficult to apply to activities in the
17th and 18th centuries, when the roles of public vessels were less rigid and
these ships often served hybrid purposes. La Contesta was one such ship
that converted from protector of merchant galleons to one of the merchant
galleons it was originally meant to protect. (R. at 5). The SMCA seems to
anticipate this problem by specifying that a sunken military craft is a craft
on military, noncommercial service when it sank. SMCA § 1408(3)(A). As
discussed above, at the time La Contesta sank, it was serving a non-military
purpose. Additionally, at the time of the SMCA’s ratification, the term
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“military noncommercial service” appeared in several treaties. All of these
treaties included the word “only” before the term “military noncommercial
service.” For example, in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS],
Article 96 states: “Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on
government non-commercial service shall, on the high seas, have complete
immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.” Id.,
art. 96 at 1288 (emphasis added). The language also appears in Article 236,
which states: “The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection
and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship,
naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and
used, for the time being, only on government noncommercial service.” Id.,
art. 236 at 1315 (emphasis added). Similarly, the annex to the Madrid
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty states: “This
Annex shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary or other ship owned
or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government
noncommercial service.” The Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection
to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, Annex IV, Art. 11, para. 1, 30 ILM
1455, 1485 (1991) (emphasis added). The use of “only” in these treaties
suggests they were intended to exclude vessels that were not exclusively on
military, noncommercial service. This meaning of noncommercial service
clarifies the SMCA’s application to historic wrecks. Because La Contesta
was not an exclusively military and noncommercial vessel but rather a
hybrid of commercial and noncommercial service, it is not a sunken
military craft as defined by the SMCA. The laws of salvage and finds apply
to the vessel, and Galleon is entitled to title to it or, in the alternative, a
salvage award.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO THE VESSEL
OR ITS CARGO, AND CONSENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO
SALVAGE THE WRECKAGE.
It is well settled admiralty law that warships and other craft on
government service are protected by the concept of sovereign immunity.
UNCLOS at arts. 95 and 96. However, as previously discussed, the vessel
in question is on commercial service. For this and the following reasons, the
owner of the wreckage cannot claim the protection of sovereign immunity.
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Assuming the wreck is La Contesta, Spain is not entitled to
immunity under the FSIA.

The FSIA is the sole basis for acquiring subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign states and their agents and instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1330, 1602-1611 (West 2008); Fagot Rodriguez v. Republic of Costa Rica,
297 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002). The statute declares foreign states shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, subject to certain exceptions.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1604. One exception is that foreign states are not immune
from U.S. jurisdiction in any admiralty action to enforce a maritime lien
against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, when the lien is based upon a
commercial activity of the foreign state.” Id. § 1605(b). Galleon must put
on evidence this exception applies, but Spain bears the ultimate burden of
disproving this issue. Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d
1012, 1016 (2nd Cir. 1993).
This is a case for title to or a salvage award for salvage activities
conducted on unidentified wreckage, and thus it falls within the definition
of a maritime lien. (R. at 4); Jupiter Wreck, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F.Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(explaining salvage services give rise to a maritime lien). The requirement
the lien be based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state is also met.
The FSIA defines “commercial activity” as “either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.” 28
U.S.C.A. § 1603(d). As previously discussed, foreign states engage in
commercial activity for the purposes of the statute when they exercise only
those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Weltover, 504
U.S. at 614. Applying this rationale, the Court must find Spain engaged in
commercial activity when it sailed La Contesta.
Though the wreck is not definitely identified as the La Contesta,
historical data suggests that vessel sank while carrying commercial trading
goods, private passengers, and other cargo. (R. at 6). Other merchant ships
making the voyage were carrying similar items. (R. at 6). Legal scholars
surmise that ships carrying persons and goods are considered commercial
enterprises since they are carried out by the state in competition with private
enterprises. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the
Arrest of State Owned Ships: The Need for an Admiralty Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1274 (1983). Notably, the district court ruled
La Contesta was on a commercial mission at the time of its sinking. (R. at
9). Thus, Spain cannot effectively claim sovereign immunity protection.
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If the Court should determine the FSIA exception does not apply,
the rem at issue is abandoned, and thus its owner cannot claim
sovereign immunity.

Under the law of finds, a plaintiff is entitled to a claim of ownership if
he can show (1) intent to reduce the property to possession; (2) actual or
constructive possession of the property; and (3) that the property is either
owned or abandoned. See R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and
Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 532 (4th Cir. 2006). In the present case,
the first two elements are not at issue; the only question is whether the
vessel and its cargo are abandoned. Abandonment is the voluntary
relinquishment of one’s right to property. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602,
610 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, one who abandons his property is precluded
from a later claim of sovereign immunity. Applying traditional principles
of maritime law, this Court must find that the vessel and cargo are indeed
abandoned.
The question of what constitutes abandonment has troubled U.S. courts
for decades. In fact, the Supreme Court has deliberately left the definition of
the term open. See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491,
508 (1998). The Sixth Circuit has ruled that abandonment need not be
expressly stated and may be implied by a combination of several factors
proved clearly and convincingly. Fairport Int’l Exploration, Inc. v. The
Shipwrecked Vessel, Captain Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491, 499 (6th Cir. 1999).
Such a combination of factors is present in this case.
The fact that this vessel sunk centuries ago and remains underwater is
primary evidence of its abandonment. Courts have recognized that to
assume a ship that has spent centuries in the depths of the sea retains its
owner “stretches a fiction to absurd lengths.” Treasure Salvors, Inc. v
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337
(5th Cir. 1978). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has expressly stated that it views
“length of time as one factor among several relevant to whether a court may
infer abandonment.” Fairport Int’l Exploration, 177 F.3d at 499. Further,
though it is not unequivocally clear Spain is indeed the owner of the
wreckage, in the event that it is, Spain has declined to search for the
wreckage of La Contesta for more than 200 years despite the fact the
approximate place of her sinking was known. (R. at 5). This too suggests
the country has abandoned the vessel and cargo. Moyer v. Wrecked and
Abandoned Vessel, Known as Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. 1099, 1105 (D.
N.J. 1993) (stating factors including place of the shipwreck as well as the
conduct of the parties having ownership rights in the vessel are evidence of
abandonment) (citation omitted). Finally, the availability of technology to

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/14

12

BB_GALLEON_26.2

2009]

7/27/2009 5:52 PM

BEST BRIEF OVERALL: GALLEON ENTERPRISES

607

salvage the wreck, coupled with the failure of the owner to do so, is another
factor to be considered. Fairport Int’l Exploration v. The Captain Lawrence, 245 F.3d 857, 864 (6th Cir. 2001). Though the “mailbox” technique
necessary to reach the vessel in this case has been in use for more than 40
years, Spain, or any other country, has not attempted to salvage the ship. (R.
at 7). This, too, indicates the wreck is abandoned.
The Fourth Circuit has suggested only an express statement is
sufficient to prove abandonment when a party appears to assert ownership,
as in the present case. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or
Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 640 (4th Cir. 2000). However, this contention does
not comport with existing case law. To the contrary, numerous courts have
considered an owner asserting an interest in a historic wreck as only one
circumstance to be considered, along with other recognized factors such as
lapse of time, non-use, location of the vessel, and efforts by the owner to
recover the ship. See Martha’s Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065
(1st Cir. 1987) (explaining abandonment can be inferred when the circumstances give rise to that inference); Moyer, 836 F.Supp at 1105 (D. N.J.
1993) (stating non-use by the owner and lapse of time indicate abandonment).
Though Spain has made a blanket statement alleging it did not
relinquish ownership in any sunken vessel under its service, this is not
sufficient to defeat a finding of abandonment. (R. at 10). There is no
conclusive evidence this wreck is the La Contesta. As previously
discussed, the ship could be the vessel of any country, and the cargo could
be jettisoned from another wreck or cargo from a pirate ship. To find that
Spain’s statement defeats a finding of abandonment will preclude Galleon
from obtaining its rights to the rem under the law of finds or, alternatively,
the law of salvage. Simply, there is no evidence this vessel is the La
Contesta. Thus Spain’s statement of non-abandonment cannot overcome
the other factors that suggest it is abandoned.
C.

Sovereign immunity similarly does not apply to the cargo
recovered by Galleon because the rem is within the jurisdiction of
the Court.

Article III of the Constitution extends the power of U.S. federal courts
to all cases concerning admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress further implemented this article by granting district
courts original jurisdiction over any civil cases of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction and “any prize brought into the United States” as well as all
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proceedings involving that prize. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2008). This case is an
in rem action. (R. at 4). In rem actions are prosecuted to enforce rights
against things rather than individuals. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 388
(1879) (emphasis added). Because in rem actions adjudicate rights to
specific property brought before the court, the judgment rendered operates
against anyone in the world making a claim against the property. R.M.S.
Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 957 (4th Cir. 1999); See The Moses
Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 427 (1866). However, in order to exercise in
rem jurisdiction over the cargo from a shipwreck, a court must have that
cargo within the district in which the action is filed. Haver, 171 F.3d at 964.
In this case, Galleon has brought several items recovered from the wreck
before the Court, and thus this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
parties’ interest in these items. (R. at 11).
D.

In the alternative, if the Court should determine sovereign
immunity does apply, consent of the sovereign is not required for
salvage activities.

Principles of salvage law are designed to encourage prompt rendering
of services to ships in marine peril by assuring payment and reward to
salvors for their efforts. Haver, 171 F.3d at 962. A salvor acts on behalf of
the owner of a ship to save his property, though no such request may have
been made, as salvage law assumes the owner desires his property to be
saved. Id. at 963. As such, it would be against well-settled principles of
salvage law and thus improper to require Galleon to obtain the consent of
the ship’s owner before continuing its salvage activities.
Salvors are granted the right to possess another’s property with the
intent to save it from destruction, danger, or loss until compensated by its
owner. Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817
F.Supp. 953, 961 (M.D. Fla. 1993). As such, an owner cannot defeat a
salvor’s right to rescue a vessel by later claiming the assistance was
unwarranted. See generally Int’l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified
Wrecked & Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000). While the
right to save distressed vessels is not inherent, only an express rejection of
the service by the owner can prevent a salvor from undertaking salvage
activities on wreckage he alone has discovered. Lathrop, 817 F.Supp at 964.
The sovereign typically communicates his rejection through a sign, buoy,
marker or public advertisement. Id. The owner of the ship has taken no
such action in this case. While Spain argues it is the ship’s owner and it
rejects Galleon’s services, no conclusive evidence unequivocally proves
this fact. Thus, the ship’s owner has not expressly denied Galleon’s services
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and to deny Galleon from continuing its salvage activities cuts against timehonored policies of salvage law.
Courts have address the particular problem of the uncertainty of
ownership of historic shipwrecks by stating that to bar a salvor from
pursuing action to secure salvage rights on a wreck until it is capable of
precisely identifying the owner presents serious policy problems. Fathom
Exploration, 352 F.Supp.2d at 1230 (noting it would “defy logic” to bar
Fathom from conducting salvage on a wreck until a owner is identified and
notified). If identification of the wreck, and thus permission of the
sovereign, were required, a salvor of unidentified wreckage would have no
method by which to prevent claimants and competing salvors from
essentially overtaking his salvage site. As the court opined in Fathom
Exploration, to require a salvor by law to positively identify the owner of
wreckage would place him in a serious predicament and force him to (1)
surreptitiously engage in salvage activities so as to prevent being noticed by
other claimants or salvors; (2) make reckless guesses as to the ship’s
identity or owner; or (3) avoid undertaking salvage activities altogether for
fear he will not be compensated. Id. at 1224. To impose a duty to seek
consent on a salvor would effectively create a “moratorium” on the thriving
and beneficial practice of marine salvage, which serves such an important
historical purpose. Id. at 1230.
III. THE NOAA ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
WHEN IT DENIED GALLEON’S APPLICATION FOR A
RESEARCH AND RECOVERY PERMIT.
This court reviews the NOAA denial of Galleon’s application for a
research and recovery permit under a rational basis standard of review
pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. §
702(2)(A) (2008); See Alaska Factory Trawler Ass’n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d
1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987). Agency decisions must be set aside if they are
found by the Court to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 702(2)(A). The Court
must examine whether the agency considered the relevant data and
articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,
1414 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
The regulations of the GCNMS dictate that salvors must apply for a
Research/Recovery of Sanctuary Historical Resources Permit if they desire
to undertake salvage activities within the sanctuary boundaries. 15 C.F.R. §
922.166(C)(1) (2008). The director of the agency may, at his discretion,
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grant a permit to the applicant if the following requirements are met: (1) the
activity satisfies the General Permit requirements; (2) the recovery of the
historical resource is in the public interest; (3) the recovery is part of
research to preserve historic information for public use; and (4) the
recovery is necessary or appropriate to protect the resource, preserve
historical information, and/or further the policies and purposes of the
NMSA and the GCNMS. 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(C)(2)(i-iv). Notably,
whether the owner or presumed owner of the wreckage would consent to
salvage is not one of the factors to be considered.
A.

The NOAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it
considered factors other than those contemplated by Congress in
denying Galleon’s permit application.

The Supreme Court has stated that an agency rule should be
considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency relied on factors Congress
did not intend for it to consider. failed to consider an important aspect of the
issue. offered an explanation for its decision that was not in accordance
with the evidence before the agency. or is entirely implausible. Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Because the NOAA relied on factors outside of
Congress’ contemplation of the purposes of the NMSA in denying
Galleon’s permit, its decision must be found arbitrary and capricious.
The GCNMS was created pursuant to the NMSA. In enacting the
NMSA, Congress outlined a number of purposes and policies of the system:
(1) to identify, designate, and manage areas of national marine significance;
(2) to provide comprehensive and coordinated conservation and
management of the sanctuaries; (3) to maintain, protect, repair, and enhance
biological communities; (4) to enhance public awareness and appreciation
of sustainable use of the resources in the designated sanctuaries; (5) to
promote, support, and coordinate scientific research of these areas; (6) to
facilitate public and private uses of the resources; (7) to develop and
implement coordinated management plans for the sanctuaries in accordance
with other federal agencies and state and local governments; (8) to create
models and incentives to manage the areas; and (9) to cooperate with global
programs of marine conservation. 16 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1-9) (2008).
Notably, at no time did Congress contemplate preserving historical artifacts
or resources that other countries might lay claim to. However, this factor
was the sole reason the NOAA cited when denying Galleon’s permit. (R. at
7). Thus, under the State Farm standard, NOAA’s decision must be found
arbitrary and capricious.
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In the alternative, should the Court determine Spain’s approval
was a proper consideration, the NOAA failed to articulate a
rational connection between the facts found and the decision
made.

As previously stated, when issuing a decision, an administrative
agency must state a rational relationship between the facts found and the
decision rendered. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 898 F.2d at 1414 (citation
omitted). In the present case, upon receiving Galleon’s permit application,
the only express criteria for the NOAA to consider were the aforementioned
requirements. The record states the NOAA summarily denied Galleon’s
application by simply stating it determined the wreckage was presumably
that of a Spanish vessel and the salvor had failed to include documentation
of Spain’s approval to excavate the site. (R. at 7). However, this
explanation, in the context of the requirements to obtain a research and
recovery permit, does not articulate a rational basis for denial. If an
ownership consideration was proper, further explanation by the agency was
needed.
Galleon met each element needed to obtain a GCNMS research and
recovery permit under the written regulations. As such, the NOAA should
have granted its request. Whether Galleon met the general permit requireements is not at issue. As to the remaining elements, it is well settled law
that the recovery of long lost historical shipwrecks is in the public’s interest
and is essential to the preservation of historical information for the public’s
use. MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 631 F.Supp. 308, 310 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (stating the public interest
favors the award of exclusive salvage rights to salvors); Columbus-America
Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. (Columbus-America I), 974 F.2d
450, 468 (4th Cir. Va. 1992) (explaining that archeological preservation of
a site is particularly compelling to the public interest when a ship offers an
opportunity to create a historical record); Haver, 171 F.3d at 954
(recognizing organized salvage efforts are needed to protect the public’s
interest in salvaging historically significant shipwrecks). Similarly, courts
have also ruled that historic wrecks are in marine peril and thus should be
rescued to preserve their historical information.
Platoro Ltd. v.
Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1980);
Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 549 F.Supp. 540, 557 (D.C. Fla. 1982). The permission of a
wreck’s owner or presumed owner is not an express factor in whether a
permit should be granted. However, if the Court should find this is an
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appropriate consideration for the agency, its explanation of its reasoning is
seriously lacking.
The Supreme Court has ruled that in reviewing an agency decision
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the reviewing court is not to
compensate for deficiencies in the agency’s explanation of its ruling. State
Farm, 463 U.S. 29 at 103. In essence, the court “may not supply a reasoned
basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.” Id.
However, this is precisely what has occurred in this case. According to the
record, the NOAA summarily denied the permit, with its only explanation
for the decision being that “based upon the information submitted by
Galleon” the ship was presumably the remains of a Spanish frigate and
Spain’s permission to excavate the wreck was not presented to the agency.
(R. at 7). However, the district court significantly expands upon the reasons
for denial in its discussion, opining that the artifacts before the court are
presumably of Spanish origin. (R. at 13). The court further comments that
Galleon has not presented any documentation that vessels other than those
flying under the Spanish flag sank in the area. (R. at 13). While the district
court’s surmising does serve to explain more fully the agency’s decision
making process, under the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in State
Farm, such speculation as to why the agency ruled as it did is inappropriate.
State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 at 103. When viewed alone, the NOAA did not
rationally articulate the connection between the facts it found and the
decision it rendered. Thus, this Court must find the agency’s denial of
Galleon’s permit was arbitrary and capricious.
IV. IF THE NOAA DENIES GALLEON’S PERMIT FOR THE
CARGO INSIDE THE GCNMS, GALLEON IS STILL
ENTITLED TO TITLE TO OR A SALVAGE REWARD FOR
THE CARGO OUTSIDE THE SANCTUARY BECAUSE THAT
CARGO CAN BE SEGREGATED FROM THE CARGO
WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES.
Traditionally courts have treated a shipwreck as a unified res for the
purposes of jurisdiction and calculating salvage awards. See Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. the Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining the fiction of treating wrecks as
single persons for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction); Nicholas E.
Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 116, 120, 1964 AMC
1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff’d as modified, 349 F.2d 465, 1965 AMC 1673
(2nd Cir. 1965) (stating it is appropriate to take into account the value of
both vessels and their cargo to calculate salvage award). However, courts
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do have the ability to divide wrecks subject to multiple claims of ownership
and have used this ability to find part of a single shipwreck is abandoned
while another part is not.
In Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Alliance Mut. Ins. Co.
(Columbus-America II), 56 F.3d 556 (4th Cir. 1995), Columbus-America
Discovery Group brought an in rem action for title or salvage rights to the
wreck of the S.S. Central America, a nineteenth century passenger ship that
sank in the Atlantic Ocean in 1857 while carrying more than $1 million in
California gold. Columbus-America II, 56 F.3d at 561. British and American insurers intervened in the action, claiming they insured a portion of the
gold, paid claims on the lost gold, and thus had an ownership interest in any
gold Columbus-America recovered. Id. The case made its way to the
Fourth Circuit twice. The first time, one of the main issues on appeal was
whether the wreck was abandoned. Columbus-America I, 974 F.2d at 455.
The court found the insurers had not abandoned the gold and remanded the
case, directing the district court to apply the law of salvage rather than the
law of finds. Id. at 468. In doing so, the court noted that if ColumbusAmerica could prove that any of the cargo it salvaged was not insured by
the insurers seeking ownership interests in the ship, that cargo should be
found abandoned because none of its owners had come forth. Id. at 465.
Therefore, if the value of the wreck was determined to be more than the
insurers had insured, Columbus-America would get title to the surplus. Id.
Thus, the court could adjudicate part of the wreck abandoned and apply the
law of finds, while another part of the wreck could be subject to the law of
salvage.
This caused some confusion for the insurers, who argued on remand
that the court held they established an ownership interest. ColumbusAmerica II, 56 F.3d at 575. On a second appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the
court, clarifying that it had not found each insurer had verified its claim,
affirmed its earlier assertion that the wreck could be divided. The court
explained:
If the total amount of gold proved owned by the underwriters constitutes
less than one hundred percent of the gold salvaged – either because the
proof of ownership fails with regard to one or more underwriters, or
because a significant portion of uninsured gold is recovered, or for any
other reason – Columbus-America may retain the excess.

Columbus-America II, 56 F. 3d at 576.
The lower court distinguished Columbus-America I from the present
case in our favor. (R. at 12). However, the lower court misinterpreted
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Columbus-America I as holding that privately-owned cargo and cargo
owned by the insurers should be treated as one for purposes of calculating
the salvage award. (R. at 12). As explained above, Columbus-America I
held not that the cargo should be treated as one, but that it should be divided
for the purposes of applying the laws of salvage and finds.2 ColumbusAmerica II, 56 F.3d at 576. The Columbus-America series of cases is
analogous to the present case and shows that a shipwreck may be divided
according to ownership interests. It is possible that a portion of a shipwreck
is abandoned and thus subject to the law of finds, while another portion of
the wreck is not abandoned thus subject to the law of salvage. In the
present case, the situation is similar. Because the wreck site lies partly
within and partly outside the GCNMS, a portion of the shipwreck is subject
to the jurisdiction of the NMSA, while a portion of the shipwreck is not.
(R. at 4). Just as in Columbus-America I and II, where the insurers’
ownership interests did not extend to the portions of the ship they had not
insured, the NMSA’s jurisdiction does not extend to the portion of the
wreck outside of the bounds of its jurisdiction. Outside of the GCNMS, the
traditional laws of finds and salvage apply to the ship’s cargo, and Galleon
is entitled to title to this cargo under the law of finds, or in the alternative, a
salvage award under the law of salvage.
The Supreme Court also addressed this issue in California v. Deep Sea
Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998). Deep Sea Research discovered the
wreck of the Brother Jonathan, which sank in 1865 en route from Portland,
Oregon, to Vancouver, carrying more than $2 million in gold and $250,000
in army payroll. Id. at 495. Like the Columbus-America cases, some of the
Brother Jonathan’s cargo had been insured, and the insurers asserted
ownership of a portion of the wreck. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals declined to divide the wreck into abandoned and unabandoned
portions because it feared the Eleventh Amendment and the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act (“ASA”) would result in both federal and state courts
concurrently adjudicating the Brother Jonathan’s fate. Deep Sea Research
v. The Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 389 (9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and explained the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
complete adjudication of the competing claims to the Brother Jonathan in
federal court. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 508. It directed the trial

2. It is possible that the lower court misinterpreted the Fourth Circuit’s holding based
on its determination that Columbus-America should have exclusive rights to market the
salvaged gold, the proceeds of which would later be divided amongst the claimants. See
Columbus-America II, 56 F.3d at 574-575 (holding that Columbus-America should
coordinate a unified marketing plan for the gold).
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court on remand to reevaluate its determination of abandonment based on
the clarified Eleventh Amendment issue, implying that it was permissible –
even under the Eleventh Amendment and ASA – to divide a shipwreck and
determine that only a portion of the wreck is abandoned. Id.
Based on the Fourth Circuit’s determination that a shipwreck may be
divided to determine whether the law of finds or the law of salvage should
apply, and the Supreme Court’s implied approval of this ability in Deep Sea
Research, this Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court holding
that the cargo outside the GCNMS may be segregated from the cargo within
the GCNMS. Because the NOAA has no authority outside the GCNMS,
Galleon is entitled to title to the cargo, or in the alternative, a salvage
award.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE ACTED PROPERLY IN
DENYING GALLEON AN INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT
BECAUSE THE SECRETARY’S ACTIONS WERE ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS AND NO REASONABLE CONNECTION
WAS SHOWN BETWEEN THE FACTS AND THE DECISION,
AS GALLEON’S ACTIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A “TAKE”.
As was pointed out earlier, the APA governs judicial review of agency
action. 5 U.S.C. § 706. The Court should set aside an agency action if it is
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This standard of review has been applied
to decisions made by the Secretary of Commerce. American Petroleum
Institute v. Knecht, 609 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying arbitrary
and capricious review to the Secretary of Commerce’s decision regarding
state coastal zone management plan). To withstand a challenge against this
standard, the Secretary of Commerce is required to examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. Islander East
Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Connecticut Dept. of Environmental Protection, 482
F.3d 79, 94-95 (2nd Cir. 2006) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43). In
this case, the district court ruled the Secretary of Commerce acted properly
because Galleon’s activities constituted a “take” under § 1532 of the ESA
due to of the “harm” caused to the deep sea coral and Johnson seagrasses.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2008); (R. at 13). But the facts in the record do not
show that Galleon’s salvage operations constituted more than an “incidental
take,” and the Secretary of Commerce has provided zero evidence to
support its denial of an incidental take permit to Galleon, and thus, acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in its decision.
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Galleon has not performed any activities that involve anything
more than an incidental take because Galleon has not threatened
the continued existence of either the deep sea coral or the Johnson
seagrasses.

Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 in response to growing public
concern about extinctions of various species of fish, wildlife, and plants
caused by irresponsible economic growth and development that failed to
consider the negative environmental effects of such growth. Forest
Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995);
16 U.S.C. § 1531(a). As part of the ESA, it is unlawful to “take” any
endangered or threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1538. “Take” is defined to
mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. §
1532(19). However, there is an exception to this rule. A permit, known as
an “incidental take permit,” may be issued for any taking that is incidental
to the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity. 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
Without giving any reasons as to why, the Secretary of Commerce denied
Galleon’s request for an incidental take permit in the case at issue. The
ruling of the district court seems to indicate the permit was denied because
Galleon’s salvage activities were a more direct harm, as opposed to merely
incidental. (R. at 13).
The district court ruled Galleon’s actions “harmed” the deep sea coral
and Johnson seagrasses by causing degradation to their habitat. (R. at 13).
But habitat degradation is the only reason given for finding that Galleon’s
activities resulted in “harm,” and habitat degradation, standing alone, is not
sufficient to equal harm. Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. F.W.S., 273
F.3d 1229, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001). Neither the district court in this case, nor
the Secretary of Commerce, has provided any evidence to show the high
level of impairment or degradation required in order for that impairment or
degradation to amount to harm. This high level of impairment requirement
is seen in the definition of “harm,” upheld by the Supreme Court, which
states that harm is: “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such an
act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”3 50 C.F.R.

3. “The word ‘actually’ before the words ‘kills or injures’… makes it clear that habitat
modification or degradation, standing alone, is not a taking pursuant to section 9. To be
subject to section 9, the modification or degradation must be significant, must significantly
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§ 17.3 (2008); Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 696-700 (1995) (emphasis added).
In order for Galleon’s actions to be harmful and therefore constitute a
“take,” Appellees must prove that the habitat degradation prevents recovery
of the species. National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern
Railroad, 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994). What this means is habitat
degradation that constitutes “harm” should only be habitat degradation that
could result in extinction. See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, no attempt has been made
by anyone to prove that the deep sea coral would not recover from
Galleon’s drilling activities or that the Johnson seagrasses would not
recover from the mailbox activities. Certainly, no attempt has been made
by any party to prove – nor has any party even alleged – that Galleon’s
actions could result in the extinction of either the deep sea coral or the
Johnson seagrasses.
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, the appellate court dealt with
whether the construction of a school complex would result in the “take” of a
pygmy-owl. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).
The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling that there was no
“take,” holding that the district court’s final order was a “thorough, detailed,
and careful reasoned discussion and analysis of the testimony of the expert
witnesses and other evidence produced.” Id. at 925. Far from thorough and
detailed, the final order in the case at issue contains but three conclusory
sentences for the judge’s finding that Galleon’s activities constituted a
“harm.” Judge Remus provided no analysis and stated only:
I find that Galleon’s drilling to expose a historic shipwreck destroys or
degrades the deep sea coral. In addition, I also find that Galleon’s mailbox
activities also resulted in destruction of Johnson seagrasses. Thus,
Galleon’s activities resulted in harm to these two species by causing a
degradation to their habitat in the GCNMS.

(R. at 13). The district court judge, in these three conclusory sentences,
does not offer any evidence or proof as to why he found Galleon’s activities
resulted in harm and therefore does not meet the burden of proof required.
Thus, any small amount of harm done by Galleon is merely incidental to its
activities, and the Secretary of Commerce should have granted an incidental
take permit.

impair essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual injury to a protected wildlife
species.”
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The Secretary of Commerce acted arbitrarily and capriciously
because it acted without considering relevant factors and did not
demonstrate a reasoned connection between the facts and its
decision.

The Second Circuit has instructed courts applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review to consider whether the agency: (1)
considered the relevant evidence; (2) examined relevant factors; and (3)
spelled out a satisfactory rationale for its action, including demonstrating a
reasoned connection between the facts and its decision. Environmental
Defense v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 369 F.3d 193,
201 (2nd Cir. 2004). Judicial review is meaningless unless the record is
carefully reviewed to “ensure that agency decisions are founded on a
reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors.” Marsh v. Or. Natural Res.
Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). In this case, the Secretary of
Commerce provides no reasoning or explanation whatsoever for its denial
of the incidental take permit to Galleon. (R. at 13) (noting that in the only
section of the record that deals with the incidental take permit there is no
mentioning of any reason or evaluation given by the Secretary of
Commerce for its denial).
16 U.S.C. § 1539 lays out several conditions that an applicant for an
incidental take permit must meet, but as long as all of those conditions are
met, § 1539(a)(2)(B) says “the Secretary shall issue the permit.” (emphasis
added). This same section of the ESA also requires the Secretary to
“publish notice in the Federal Register of each application for an exemption
or permit which is made under this section.” § 1539(c). The purpose of
this notice is to invite the submission of arguments and data pertaining to
the application. Id. All information received is to be available as a matter
of public record at every state of the proceeding. Id. In this case,
absolutely none of this required information is found in the record. It may
be that there is a reasonable explanation for why these steps were not taken
or were not put into the record, but the reviewing court may not supply
reasons for agency action that are not in the record. Arizona Cattle
Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1236 (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142
(1973)). The Court is not empowered to substitute its own judgment for
that of the Secretary of Commerce, and the basis for the Secretary’s
decision must come from the Secretary. Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n,
273 F.3d at 1236.
As the record – or lack there of – is all we have to go by, the
Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law because
the Court is to set aside agency action found to be “without observance of
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procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). As was shown above,
there is no indication that any of the numerous procedures were observed.
Further, courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations
for agency action because those rationalizations are not articulated by the
agency itself. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50. Because the Secretary of
Commerce did not follow the procedural requirements set forth in the ESA
and did not establish that it considered relevant factors, this Court should
reverse the ruling of the lower court that the Secretary’s actions were not
arbitrary and capricious.
VI. NEITHER A COE NOR A NPDES PERMIT WAS REQUIRED
FOR GALLEON’S SALVAGE ACTIVITIES BECAUSE THE
VESSEL RESTS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
DISCHARGE OF DREDGE MATERIAL.
The United States, on behalf of the COE and the EPA, argues that
Galleon violates Section 10 of the RHA, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2008), and
section 301(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2008), by constructing a
drilling platform and drilling to expose a historic shipwreck. (R. at 10-11).
The U.S. claims the drilling platform was an obstruction to the navigable
waters of the U.S. that required a Section 10 permit and the propwash from
the Galleon’s mailboxing activities was the discharge of a pollutant and
therefore required a permit under section 301(a) of the CWA. (R. at 10).
However, under the facts set forth in the record, Galleon was required
to obtain neither of these permits, first and foremost, because the wrecked
vessel was on the outer continental shelf, outside of the territorial waters of
the United States. Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 441. The Executive
Branch does not have jurisdiction to impose permitting requirements on
Galleon outside of the territorial waters of the United States. See Treasure
Salvors, 569 F.2d at 340.
Even if the United States did have the power to control Galleon’s
activities outside of U.S. territorial waters, Galleon would not need a
NPDES permit or COE permit under the CWA because water is not dredge
material, and therefore there has been no discharge of a pollutant without a
permit. Save our Community v. U.S.E.P.A, 971 1155, 1166 (5th Cir. 1992);
Orleans Audubon Soc. v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1984).
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The United States does not have the power to interfere with
Galleon’s salvage activities in retrieving the remains of a wrecked
vessel on the Outer Continental Shelf.
1.

The CWA and RHA do not apply beyond the territorial sea of
the United States.

Legislation of Congress, unless contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Argentine
Republic, 488 U.S. at 440 (citing Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949)). This is because, when it wants to, Congress, as it has shown
by example, knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional
reach of a statute. Id. at 440. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2008) (empowering
Coast Guard to search and seize vessels “upon the high seas and waters
over which the United States has jurisdiction”); 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2008)
(extending jurisdiction to vessels on “[T]he high seas, any other waters
within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of
the jurisdiction of any particular state”); 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (permitting
President to declare portions of “high seas” as customs – enforcement
areas).Historically, the territorial sea of the United States has only extended
three nautical miles from the coast. United States v. California, 332 U.S.
32 (1947). However, beginning on December 28, 1988, the United States
began to recognize a territorial sea of twelve nautical miles, as was allowed
by international conventions. See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777
(Dec. 27, 1988). Thus, as of today, the territorial jurisdiction, and therefore
the power of the RHA and CWA to control Galleon’s activities, extends
twelve miles off the coast.
As was illustrated above, Congress has in the past extended its
jurisdiction to the high seas. But Section 10 of the RHA prohibits the
creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress to “the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. §
403 (emphasis added). Also, “dredged material” for purposes of a CWA
permit is defined as “material that is excavated or dredged from waters of
the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(k) (1979) (emphasis added).
Therefore, these statutes apply by their own terms to waters owned or
controlled by the United States. The shipwreck in this case is located
approximately twenty-three to twenty-four miles offshore and therefore
rests on the outer continental shelf, well outside the territorial waters of the
United States.
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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act does not extend the
authority of the CWA or RHA.

The government argues that “the authority of the COE to prevent
obstructions to navigation is extended by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (“OCSLA”) to fixed structures located on the Outer Continental Shelf,
including the contiguous zone.” (R. at 10) (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1333). But the OCSLA was passed not to extend the U.S.’s territorial
waters but to clarify the respective interests of coastal states and the nation
in the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf.
Treasure Salvors, Inc. 569 F.2d at 338. The Fifth Circuit has pointed out
history behind the OCSLA that demonstrates the purpose and scope of the
act:
The Truman proclamation of September 28, 1945, spurred national and
international interest in exploitation of the mineral wealth of the oceans.
The proclamation asserted the jurisdiction and control of the United States
over the mineral resources of the continental shelf, but was not intended to
abridge the right of free and unimpeded navigation of waters above the
shelf, nor to extend the limits of American territorial waters.

Id. at 338 (emphasis added). In the years after the Truman proclamation,
the U.S. and coastal states fought over control of the seabed and natural
resources beneath the navigable waters. Id.
Congress recognized the coastal states’ ownership of the seabed and
resources within the original three mile territorial sea but “emphatically
implemented its view that the United States has paramount rights to the
seabed beyond the three-mile limit.” Id. (quoting United States v. Maine,
420 U.S. 515 (1975)). Thus, the OCSLA was enacted to ensure the federal
government had authority to lease out various sections of the Outer
Continental Shelf for resource development. Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1985). The
OCSLA was not a general extension of United States sovereignty but must
be construed to comport with its purpose of establishing policies and
procedures for managing Outer Continental Shelf natural resources. Id. In
addition, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(b) provides that the Act “shall be construed in
such manner that the character as high seas of the waters above the outer
Continental Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be
affected.” This section makes clear that Congress intended to control the
seabed below, but not the waters above, and therefore the United States’
territorial jurisdiction was not increased by the OCSLA.
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Galleon did not need a COE or NPDES permit for the discharge of
a pollutant because the water used in the mailbox technique does
not constitute “dredge material.”

The CWA makes the discharge of any pollutant by any person
unlawful. 33 U.S.C. § 1311. § 1342 sets up the NPDES whereby an
individual may apply for a permit for discharge of pollutants. Permits for
discharge of dredge material may be issued under § 1344 which states the
COE may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings,
for the discharge of dredged material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites. The COE defines “dredged material” as “material that is
excavated or dredged from waters of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(k) (1979).
When it began its salvage activities, Galleon used a process known as
the “mailbox” technique to discover and remove artifacts. (R. at 6). This
technique uses elbow shaped prop wash deflectors, known as “mailboxes,”
to direct the vessel’s propeller wash downward and thereby remove seabed
sediments and seagrasses, exposing underlying materials. (R. at 6). The
United States claims the propwash from Galleon’s mailboxing constitutes a
discharge of a pollutant without a permit because the activities resulted in
the unauthorized discharge of dredged material into waters of the United
States. (R. at 11).
The district court erred in finding in favor of the United States on this
issue because the prop wash does not constitute a dredge material, as it is
nothing more than water that is normally thrust horizontally backward to
push the vessel forward, now being deflected downward. See Save Our
Community, 971 F.2d at 1166 (holding that without the existence of an
effluent discharge of some kind, there is no requirement to obtain a § 1344
discharge). In Orleans Audubon Soc., the Fifth Circuit held that “clear
water is not within the definition of a pollutant under the CWA.” Orleans
Audbon Society, 742 F.2d at 910. The court there dealt with the exact same
code provision as is at issue here – §1344, regulating permits for dredge
material. Id. The court went on to hold that § 1344 only applies when
dredged or fill material has been discharged and “water is simply not
dredged or fill material.” Id. Because the record clearly indicates only
clear water flowed into the navigable water, the COE had no jurisdiction
under §1344 to require a permit. (R. at 6). Similarly, in the case at issue,
Galleon is using nothing but the water that was already in the sea and
therefore no permits were required.
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CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, this Court should reverse the district court’s
rulings on the law of finds because the SMCA does not apply and because
the shipwrecked vessel is not subject to sovereign immunity. In the
alternative, the district court’s ruling on the law of salvage should be
affirmed in part, but should also allow for a salvage award for the treasures
found within the GCNMS. This Court should reverse the district court’s
ruling pertaining to the NOAA and the ESA and hold that the NOAA and
the Secretary of Commerce both acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying permits to Galleon. Finally, this Court should reverse the district
court’s ruling that RHA and CWA permits were required for Galleons
salvage activities and hold that Congress had no jurisdiction over Galleon’s
salvage activities, as the shipwreck lies outside the territorial waters of the
United States.
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